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The Death
Penalty Cases:
A Summary
by Charles Jay Iseman

The Supreme Court of the United
States, in five decisions announced on
July 2, 1976, reported at 44 U.S.L.W.
5229-92, established the require
ments for constitutionally valid capital
punishment laws. These requirements
include: (1) the sentencing authority
must be required to focus in on the individual circumstances surrounding the
defendant and the crime in order to
weigh any aggravating circumstances
against any mitigating circumstances; (2)
the sentence of death in any particular

14]

case must not be excessive or grossly
disproportionate with respect to the
penalty imposed in similar cases. The
Supreme Court held that the death penalty is not unconstitutional per se under
the "Cruel and Unusual Punishment"
Clause of the Eighth Amendment (as
applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment). Specifically, the
court found the death penalty statutes of
Georgia, Florida, and Texas each to be
constitutional on its face and in its application under the facts before the court.
At the same time, the court found the
mandatory death sentence laws of North
Carolina and Louisiana each unconstitutional on its face. Thus, the Court has
provided a clear legislative path for the
states to follow to escape the great legal
confusion resulting from the high court's
decision in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238 (1972).
The Furman Court determined, in essence, that all capital punishment laws
then existing were unconstitutionally
"cruel and unusual" because of the

haphazard

and arbitrary

manner

in

which they had been applied. At that
time, the Court reserved the question as
to whether the death penalty was "cruel
and unusual" per se and hence unconstitutional.
In Gregg v. Georgia, 44 U.S.L.W.
5230, the Court upheld the statute that
the Georgia Legislature enacted to replace the one specifically declared unconstitutional in Furman. The Furmanera statute gave the jury unfettered discretion to sentence to death. The postFurman statute established particular
procedures to insure that (1) the jury
would have to consider the particular
circumstances surrounding the defendant and the crime, (2) the jury would
have to state in writing those statutory
aggravating circumstances it found to
exist which permit the imposition of the
death sentence, and (3) the Georgia Supreme Court would, on expedited review, determine whether the death penalty as imposed was not grossly disproportionate to penalties imposed in simi-

lar cases. In particular, the Georgia
statute requires (1) that there be a
bifurcated (two-stage) trial with one
stage for the question of guilt or innocence and the other stage for determination of the appropriate sentence; (2) that
the death penalty be imposed only for
six categories of crime (murder, certain
kidnapings, armed robbery, rape,
treason, and aircraft hijacking); (3) that
in order to impose the death sentence for
any of the above crimes, except treason
and aircraft hijacking, the jury must find,
in writing, that the crime occurred in the
process of the commission of another
felony, that the purpose of the crime was
to receive money or items of monetary
value, or that the offense was outrageously or wantonly vile; (4) that if the
jury finds any of the circumstances
above, then it may optionally impose the
death sentence; and (5) that there be
expedited direct review by the Georgia
Supreme Court.
The defendant Gregg, a hitch-hiker,
shot and killed the operator of the car, as
well as another passenger, before stealing the automobile. The jury found
Gregg guilty of murder and armed robbery and then, in the sentencing stage,
found that the murder constituted
felony-murder and was committed for
the purpose of taking the car. No evidence in mitigation was introduced by
the defense. Thereupon the jury sentenced Gregg to death on both counts.
The Georgia Supreme Court, in expedited review, vacated the death sentence
for armed robbery on two grounds: (1)
the death penalty was excessive because
it was seldom imposed for armed robbery, and (2) it is a denial of due process
to consider murder as an aggravating
circumstance to armed robbery, once
the armed robbery has already been
considered as aggravating the murder.
However, the Georgia Supreme Court
upheld the death sentence for murder.
In affirming the Georgia decision, the
United States Supreme Court held that
the death penalty is not unconstitutionally "cruel and unusual" because: (1)
the death penalty is consistent with the
wording of the Constitution, since reference to it appears in the Fifth Amendment ("capital... crime", "jeopardy of

life or limb") and the Fourteenth
Amendment (due process clausedeprivation of life), (2) the death penalty
is consistent with contemporary standards of decency because the Legislatures of thirty-five states enacted death
penalty laws subsequent to the Furman
decision in 1972, (3) retribution and deterrence are both permissible considerations for legislative bodies debating the
enactment of capital punishment laws,
and (4) the "Cruel and Unusual
Punishment" Clause of the Eighth
Amendment prohibits torture and prohibits punishment grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime. The
Court found that the death sentence was
constitutionally imposed on Gregg because: (1) the jury was given adequate
guidance and standards with which to
impose the penalty, and the defendant
was given ample opportunity to present
any mitigating circumstances, (2) the
Georgia Supreme Court ensured that
the imposition of the death sentence was
not being administered here in an arbitrary fashion and was not grossly disproportionate to the severity of punishment in similar cases, (3) there existed
extrajudicial means of mercy, such as the
prosecutor's plea bargaining discretion
and executive clemency, which did not
render the means of imposing death sentences arbitrary and constitutionally invalid.
In Proffitt v. Florida, 44 U.S.L.W.
5256, the United States Supreme Court
upheld the Florida capital punishment
law. The Court found that the state
statute requires the trial judge (the sentencing authority) to weigh eight statutory mitigating factors, requiring the
judge to consider the individual circumstances of the defendant and the
crime in the light of legislatively enacted
standards. The Court further found that
the Florida Supreme Court has been
carefully reviewing each death penalty
case to preclude the possibility of arbitrary application and to insure uniformity. Both the Georgia and Florida statutes are similar to the capital punishment
law of the Model Penal Code.
The Supreme Court also upheld the
Texas capital punishment law in Jurek v.
Texas, 44 U.S.L.W. 5262. This statute

limits the application of the death sentence to five distinct categories of intentional and knowing murders. If the jury
finds the defendant guilty of a crime in
one of these five categories of murder, it
must then determine (1) whether the defendant's conduct causing the death was
deliberate and done with the reasonable
expectation that death would result, (2)
whether the defendant would commit
criminal acts of violence, in the future,
thereby constituting a threat to society,
and (3) if raised by the evidence,
whether the defendant's conduct was an
unreasonable response to any provocation by the victim. If the jury finds, be
yond a reasonable doubt, that each
question above must be answered affirmatively, then the death sentence is
mandatorily imposed; otherwise, the
sentence is life imprisonment. Although
this statute is ostensibly a mandatory
death sentence law, the Court found
that, in practice, the jury has to consider
any mitigating factors surrounding the
defendant and the crime. This finding of
constitutionality follows from the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals' interpretation of the "continuing threat to society"
question as requiring the jury to consider
any mitigating factors.
In contrast with the Gregg, Proffitt,
and Jurek cases, the Supreme Court
found, in Woodson v. North Carolina,
44 U.S.L.W. 5267, and Roberts v.
Louisiana, 44 U.S.L.W. 5281, that the
mandatory death sentence laws of North
Carolina and Louisiana are unconstitutional. The statutes in question require
that if a defendant is found guilty of a
crime in a particular category, then he
automatically is sentenced to death. For
example, in the North Carolina case, defendant Woodson, who served as a
look-out for co-defendant Waxton, who
committed a murder and armed rob
bery, was found guilty of first-degree
murder and automatically sentenced to
death. Since according to the statute, no
consideration of the individual circumstances surrounding the crime could
enter into the sentencing procedure, the
Court held these statutes to be unconstitutionally "cruel and unusual". The
Court interpreted the Eighth Amendment as requiring the sentencing author-
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ity to consider the character of the defendant and the circumstances surrounding the offense as a necessary part
of the procedure leading to the imposition of the death sentence.
Thus the Supreme Court, which had
invalidated death sentences imposed
under a jury's unfettered discretion in
Furman, held that the lack of exercise of
any jury discretion is equally unconstitutional when imposing the death sentence. Carefully guided discretion exer-

cised by the sentencing authority is required.
As a result of these decisions, it appears that Art. 27, §413, MD. ANN CODE
(1976 Repl. Vol.), contains a mandatory
death penalty law which is unable to
withstand a constitutional challenge. See
Woodson and Roberts, supra. Under
this section, a conviction for any one of
the eight enumerated categories of first
degree murder results in a mandatory
death sentence. Under the statute, no

consideration of the individual circumstances surrounding the defendant
and the offense may enter into the sentencing process. Consequently, the statute violates the "Cruel and Unusual
Punishment" Clause. Maryland can, of
course, amend its law to conform with
the approved standards in Gregg, Proffitt, Jurek, or the Model Penal Code and
thereby enact a constitutionally valid
capital punishment law.

Fair Trial/
Free Press
by Lindsay Schlottman

It had been a typical Saturday evening on October 18, 1975 in the farming
town of Sutherland, Nebraska-until
word began to spread of a mass murder.
Towspeople were frightened as the
search for the murderer began. Local,
regional and even national reporters
flooded the area, adding to the panic
and confusion. Finally, early Sunday
morning, a suspect named Charles
Erwin Simants was arrested and charged
with six counts of murder. Mr. and Mrs.
Henry Kellie, their son David, and three
grandchildren lay dead. The charges
were amended later to include sexual assault.
Rumors began circulating of a confession by Simants. Because of his concern
that Simants' trial be free of prejudicial
publicity, the County Judge entered a
restrictive order on October 22 banning
full news coverage of the public preliminary hearing until a jury could be impaneled. Several press and broadcast
associations, publishers, and individual
reporters moved for leave to intervene in
the state District Court, asking that the
order imposed by the County Court be
vacated. The District Judge granted this
motion to intervene, and then entered
his own restrictive order on October 27,
detailing items not to be reported. The
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